The Supreme Court and Trade Dress - A Short Comment by Kratzke, William P.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 24 | Number 1 Article 3
1-1-2001
The Supreme Court and Trade Dress - A Short
Comment
William P. Kratzke
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court and Trade Dress - A Short Comment, 24 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 73 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol24/iss1/3
The Supreme Court and Trade Dress - A
Short Comment
by
WILLIAM P. KRATZKE*
I. Introduction .............................................................................. 74
II. Tradem ark Principles ............................................................... 74
III. Copying, Functionality, and the Distinction
B etw een Them ......................................................................... 80
IV . R ecent C ases .............................................................................. 86
A. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc ................................ 86
B. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co .............................. 93
C. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc ................. 97
D. TrafFix Devices, Inc v. Marketing Displays, Inc ................ 101
V . C onclusion .................................................................................... 106
* Cecil C. Humphreys Professor of Law, University of Memphis School of Law.
B.A., University of Washington; J.D., Valparaiso University; L.L.M., Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center.
I
Introduction
In the space of nine years, the United States Supreme Court has
decided four cases concerning matters of trade dress and
functionality. In so doing, the Court has positioned the doctrine of
functionality so that it is broader and trade dress protection for
product configuration (not packaging) so that it is correspondingly
narrower than many may wish. The Court has quite correctly
concluded that the trade dress of a product itself, while potentially a
source identifier for consumers, should not be treated as if it were a
more ordinary trademark' for the simple reason that consumers do
not expect such trade dress to serve an identificatory2  or
informational function, i.e., to function as a trademark. Thus, the
Court has redefined the protection of trademarks in a way that
hopefully restores the interests of consumers to a position paramount
to the interests of competitors.
The first two sections of this comment examine some basic
trademark principles. The third section examines the opinions of the
four Supreme Court cases, noting the shift in trade dress and
functionality doctrines in the broader context of trademark theory.
This comment concludes that trademark law, as it applies to matters
of trade dress, more accurately meets the expectations of consumers
and serves their interests than it did nine years ago.
II
Trademark Principles
Trademark law is a system of conditional and limited
entitlements that should help to maximize overall societal value. A
trademark is a word, name, symbol, or device - a phrase with
perhaps an unlimited scope4 - that identifies and distinguishes the
1. This comment uses the term "trademark" to refer to "trademark" or "service
mark."
2. This term is defined at Webster's Third New International Dictionary (un-
abridged) 1123 (1993) as "concerned with or serving for identification."
3. This section is a derived from my article, William P. Kratzke, Normative Eco-
nomic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 U. Mem. L. Rev. 199 (1991).
4. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) ("It is the
source- distinguishing ability of a mark - not its ontological status as color, shape, fra-
grance, word, or sign - that permits it to serve" the basic purposes of a trademark.); but see
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does
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user's trademarked products or services from others' products or
services. Trademarks must perform this identificatory function for
consumers and inform consumers of material information. Material
information is information that may actually affect a consumer
choice.' A recognized trademark may inform the consumer of a
product's source or quality, as well as other less relevant factors
related to consumer choice. Moreover, the consumer must rely on a
product's identificatory and informational feature in making a choice
- as opposed to merely recognizing the feature as an aspect of the
product she or he has already chosen.6
Trademarks have the characteristic that once they exist, they are
non-rivalrous in consumption, i.e., they are not scarce, and use by one
does not reduce the supply for use by another. Hence, legally
enforceable rights of exclusivity exist only because trademark law, in
pursuit of some public policy, states that they should. In order to
maximize value to consumers and to society as a whole, public policy
in the United States favors a competitive market economy, one that
rewards producers who sell the goods and services that consumers
want in terms of quality, quantity, and price. No other system
succeeds in maximizing consumers' utility - or maximizing anything
else, for that matter - as well as a competitive market economy.
Trademark law in turn enhances the performance of a
competitive market economy by recognizing the right of particular
users of trademarks to use those marks for particular purposes
exclusively. Such exclusive use enables consumers to identify and
distinguish products in the market so that they make accurate
purchasing decisions quickly. Consumer association of a mark with a
certain level of quality also facilitates entry into other markets,
thereby increasing competition.
Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 Hastings L.J. 1131, 1133-62 (2000) (tracing mis-
steps in evolution of this position); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
Emory L.J. 367, 380 (1999) (legislative history of Lanham Act indicated that "trademark"
not intended to include trade dress or product features).
5. See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
that a television viewer is not particularly concerned about relation between station and
event-sponsor); Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167,
173 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (holding that more than identity of marks must be shown when pur-
chasers of tee-shirts do not care whether registrant sponsors or endorses product).
6. See Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes, supra n. 4, at 1159-60.
("Consumers may recognize the shape of a kitchen stand mixer or a golf course hole, but
that does not necessarily mean that consumers are relying on the shape to identify the
product's source, particularly where the product is otherwise properly labeled." (footnotes
omitted)).
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Absent an informational and identificatory function, the law
should accord putative trademarks no protection.' It is the province of
patent and copyright law to provide protection to creative efforts that
do not yield informational and identificatory benefits to consumers.8
The law's recognition of an exclusive interest in identificatory and
informational devices encourages producers to produce goods of
consistent and high quality: consistent so that consumers are not
disappointed by the performance of a product or service and
thereafter patronize a different provider, and high so that the
informational value of the trademark, which might be captured
completely by the seller, is as great as possible. Trademarks reduce
consumers' search. Use one's trademark by another may constitute
infringement, and, if so, raises consumers' search costs. Trademarks
reflect a reputation on which consumers rely.
Users of marks should have certain exclusive rights of use when
such exclusivity enhances the performance of a competitive market
economy in creating value for the persons for whom such an economy
exists, i.e., consumers. Such value is created only when the putative
trademark does, in fact, provide information regarding the product or
service to consumers.
Until a word, name, symbol, or device plays some informa-
tional and identificatory role with respect to a product, it has
no value. This informational and identificatory role that
trademarks play in assisting consumers to determine and
make 9 purchasing choices is the source of a trademark's
value.
However, value, in the sense that someone would be willing to pay for
something, might exist if the law protects competitors' interests
irrespective of any consumer benefit. For example, value to
consumers may be created through competition in the putative
product identifier itself,l" as occurs when the putative identifier is
7. See generally Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra n. 4, at 484 (arguing that
preventing consumer deception should be basis of trademark rights, not property).
8. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
9. Kratzke, supra n. 3, at 205.
10. See Kellogg Co. v. Natl. Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) ("Sharing in the
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right pos-
sessed by all - and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply inter-
ested.").
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"functional."1 Nevertheless, those entitled to use a trademark
exclusively for identificatory and informational purposes often claim
entitlements that extend to functional use of the mark.12 The existence
of such value is no reason for trademark law to protect it.13 Rather,
the law should reflect a policy of maximizing value, and it does that
by maximizing value to consumers. Net value is maximized for
consumers when free competition in the functional feature occurs
rather than when exclusive rights of use are given to one user." The
lower prices that competition generates enable more consumers to
enjoy products that make functional use of marks, while paying a
price no higher than the seller's marginal cost. Foregoing such a
consumer benefit is a needlessly incurred loss.
The competitive market economy depends upon interbrand
competition to maximize benefits to consumers. Therefore, legal
protection of trademarks should be limited to occasions where they
promote such competition. Any alternative principle elevates
interests other than consumers' to a paramount position and foregoes
consumer value. Legal protection of trademarks facilitates interbrand
competition by providing consumers with information about products
and services, and by facilitating entry into markets, thereby increasing
the level of competition. Consumers quickly and accurately reward
the providers who give them the greatest value, and they implicitly
punish those who do not. More entrants into a market means greater
choice for consumers.
A redistribution of wealth among competitors on a basis other
than benefit to consumers is not a costless transaction and does not
create or enhance consumer value. Such redistributions are not value
maximizing. To the extent they are based on market power,
consumers who are willing to pay the marginal cost of producing the
product but who are denied access to it because the price is higher
than its marginal cost, forego value. There is a further reduction in
overall wealth because redistributions are not costless. Limiting the
11. Kratzke, supra n. 3, at 205.
12. But see e.g. Boston Prof Hockey Assn., Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving the unlicensed use of logos of National Hockey
League teams on patches), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
13. See Internatl. News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (gathering and disseminating news; existence of property not dependent on
value but upon exclusion by law from interference).
14. See Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that more consumers would purchase products if any competitor
who wanted to serve them were permitted to do so).
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law's protection of trademarks to their identificatory and
informational power is not unfair to sellers who seek rewards for
themselves on a basis other than maximizing consumer value because
competitors implicitly agree to the rules of competition when they
undertake to play. Moreover, the source of their market success
should be quality products, not artificially maintained market power.
The identificatory and informational power of a putative
trademark takes on varying degrees of materiality depending on
when and how consumers benefit from such trademark roles. When a
consumer uses such information to select which of several alternatives
he or she will buy, the materiality of that information is the greatest
possible as the consequences of inaccurate information are direct
pecuniary loss. Moreover the consequences of such a direct loss are
that the wrong competitor benefits and the wrong competitor loses,
which is the reason competitors may sue each other vicariously to
avenge consumers' losses. We recognize the use of inaccurate
information of this sort as passing off. However there are other
identificatory and informational uses of a trademark that may provide
very little material information to consumers, such as when the
trademark implies, perhaps only in the weakest manner, immaterial
sponsorship or endorsement.15 Even if a consumer is wrong in his or
her impressions regarding the substance of such information, he or
she incurs little or no injury if he or she simply does not care. Such
information, if accurate, would not have changed the consumer's
purchasing choice, and thus it is not material. Treating trademark use
in such situations as exclusive bestows market power with no benefit
to consumers.
The material identificatory and informational power of a
putative trademark or source identifier is relevant to the protection
that the law should accord it. Call this material identificatory and
informational power "I"; call the first user "f' and second (and any
subsequent) user "s." Trademark law should protect a putative
product identifier only when the identifier actually imparts
information to consumers, i.e., when If > 0." If competition is an
important public policy, and it is, the cost to subsequent competitors
of competing on the same basis as the first user of a putative product
identifier is also relevant to whether the law should protect one user's
interests at the expense of another's. Call the cost of competing "C."
15. See WCVB-TV, 926 F.2d at 46; Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 714 F.
Supp. at 173.
16. This is not the same as saying that I, > 0.
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Trademark law should permit a presumptively equally capable
enterprise to that of the first user of a putative product identifier to
create the same type of identifier for a cost no greater than that
incurred by the first user. If the supply of the same type of identifiers
is small, then the cost to such a competitor of competing on the same
basis is great. Conversely, if the supply of the same type of identifier
is great, then the cost to such a competitor of competing on the same
basis is small, and the informational and identificatory power of such
a mark is great. 7
Consumers have the greatest interest in the law's protecting
putative product identifiers when I1, is great and C is small. We can
make a ratio to measure the efficiency with which messages are
imparted." If I/C is great, then the law should accord the first user a
protectible interest in its identifier. The value of this quotient will be
great when I, is great, e.g., when a trademark is well-recognized by
consumers, perhaps because it has strong secondary meaning. The
value of this quotient will be great when C. is small, e.g., when the
mark is arbitrary or fanciful thus implying that there are many
alternatives that can be cheaply chosen. If the value of C. is very low,
e.g., the first user's mark is inherently distinctive, trademark law
protects the first user's mark even if If is also small because the value
of I,/C. is large. But this can only be true if I, has some value, which it
may simply by virtue of the fact that consumers affirmatively look to
the identificatory and informational feature, such as a logo, to impart
information. Conversely, the value of this quotient will be small when
If is small, e.g., when a descriptive term has no secondary meaning.
When a product feature neither identifies the product nor generates
the least consumer expectation that it will, If = 0. Such a putative
identifier is not entitled to the status of "trademark." So also, the
value of this quotient will be small when C. is great, e.g., when the
putative source identifier is a generic term or a functional feature.
These variables and the resulting ratios can be applied to the
United States Supreme Court's recent holdings in the trade dress
17. See France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.) ("If
the name or mark be truly arbitrary, strange, and fanciful, it is more specially and pecu-
liarly significant and suggestive of one man's goods, than when it is frequently used by
many and in many differing kinds of business."), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
Econ. 265, 276 (1987) ("[T]he greater W is (that is, the larger the universe of possible
names for X), the greater will be the productivity of a firm's trademark in reducing search
costs for its brand.").
18. Obviously these values cannot be quantified, but they are easily conceptualized.
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area. First, this comment examines some principles that have evolved
from earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, which maximized the
value of I/C,.
III
Copying, Functionality, and the Distinction Between Them
The United States Supreme Court defined the scope of patent
law and free competition policies vis-a-vis state law in three
significant decisions." The preemptive scope of the
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats doctrine is both restrictive and
permissive. It is restrictive in that it precludes competition on matters
for which there is a utility patent; it is permissive in that it requires
that there be free competition in everything else," including creative
and unique features. Thus, if a product feature is not patentable,
those features may be freely copied by competitors." The only
exception to this is if the feature identifies the product to consumers,
but only if exclusivity of the feature does not inhibit competition, a
condition that is applied in the doctrine of functionality.22
The United States Supreme Court addressed the standards or
tests for functionality of trade dress in the case of Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.23 In that case, plaintiff-
respondent Ives had a patent on a drug that it marketed to hospitals
in blue capsules for one dosage and in blue-red capsules for a
different dosage.24 The patent expired and defendants-petitioners
began marketing a generic copy of the drug and used the same colors
for their capsules for the same dosages.2 Ives made several claims
against petitioners, one of which was that the capsules' colors were
19. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Compco
Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
20. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151 ("To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must
determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use." (citation omit-
ted)); Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237 (holding that state law may not forbid copying of
unpatented article); Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 (holding that an unpatented article is in public
domain and competitor has right to copy it).
21. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Ra-
tional Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 595, 596 (1996) (arguing that
there is a constitutional right to copy).
22. See id. at 611.
23. 456 U.S. 844, 846 (1982).
24. Id. at 847.
25. Id.
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not functional and had developed secondary meaning to consumers.
The United States Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
New York ruled against Ives on this claim, 7 but the United States
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, without addressing the question of
functionality, reversed on other grounds. The Supreme Court
reversed.29 The Court stated that "a product feature is functional if it
is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article."3
This definition of functionality is in the alternative. The first part
requires that a feature be essential in order to be functional, surely a
very high standard of functionality,3' for very few product features in
which anyone would try to claim an exclusive interest are truly
essential in the sense that the product could not exist without them.
The second part, the alternative definition, establishes a much lower
threshold of functionality. Surely there are many, if not most, features
of products that affect their cost or quality but are not essential to the
use or purpose of the article. By melding these alternatives together,
or by simply focusing on competitive need, lower courts could raise
the standard of functionality considerably above merely affecting cost
or quality. Effective competition depends on competitors having
equal access to the features of a product that make it a marketing
success, including features that appeal to the aesthetic tastes of
consumers,32 not merely the utilitarian features.3  If an aesthetic
feature appeals to consumers, it is not enough to warrant exclusive
protection that competitors could design the same feature another
way if that feature has no material identificatory and informational
power in'the hands of the first user.
In federal courts where Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act' is
26. Id. at 850.
27. Id. at 851.
28. Id. at 853.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 850 n. 10.
31. See Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1341,
1361 (1987) (noting that essentiality is not sole determinant of functionality).
32. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952).
33. W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 346 (7th Cir. 1985)("A feature can be
functional not only because it helps the product achieve the objective for which the prod-
uct would be valued by a person indifferent to matters of taste, charm, elegance, and
beauty, but also because it makes the product more pleasing to people not indifferent to
such things.").
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997):
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applicable, Professor McCarthy notes that "functionality" has become
a doctrine that accommodates the policies of trademark (trade dress),
patent law, and free competition. 5 If he is correct, the doctrine of
functionality has swallowed up, and now defines the right to copy.36
Lower courts have taken the Supreme Court's definition and
embellished it to the point that, as McCarthy observes, "[i]t seems
that there are as many definitions of what is 'functional' as there are
courts."37 Lower courts often focus on the availability of alternatives,38
rather than on whether the design was an important ingredient in the
marketing success of the product, or for that matter, whether the
feature has any informational and identificatory power at all.39
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
(3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for
trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who as-
serts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter
sought to be protected is not functional.
35. 1 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7.63 (4th ed.,
West 2001) (Functionality accommodates trade dress law, patent law, and free competi-
tion.).
36. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981) ("'Proof
of nonfunctionality generally requires a showing that the element of the product serves no
purpose other than identification.'" (quoting SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labo-
ratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980))).
37. McCarthy, supra n. 35, at § 7.69 (referring to utilitarian functionality).
38. See e.g. Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th
Cir. 1999) ("The appropriate question is whether the particular product configuration is a
competitive necessity."), rev'd, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
39. See e.g. Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes, supra n. 4, at 1159-60
(Lower courts have protected trade dress in absence of evidence of consumer reliance on
packaging or appearance to identify product's source, in absence of showing that trade
dress even functions as a trademark.).
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The Supreme Court in SearslCompcolBonito Boats implied that
a competitor's right to copy a utilitarian feature of a product may
have one of two bases insofar as state law is concerned." These bases
are not co-terminal. A competitor may copy any product or feature,
including those that are clever, ornate, unique, so long as the copied
feature does not cause confusion "as to who had manufactured...
nearly identical articles."" A competitor may copy any functional
feature of a product, even if it (for a time) performs an informational
and identificatory function. If a feature is functional and a competitor
copies it, trademark law contemplates some confusion in order to
establish competition. "2 Thus non-functionality is not a counterpoise
to a right to copy, and functionality is not a necessary condition to a
right to copy.
When an aesthetic feature rather than a utilitarian feature is
involved, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is usually the basis of
plaintiffs' claims for trade dress infringement because rarely, except
for color, is an aesthetic feature registered. Congress enacted Section
43(a) to prevent falsehoods, not competitive copying, as the language
of the statute still"3 makes clear. Unfortunately, it has evolved into a
federal unfair competition statute, developing in the way of the
common law, incrementally." It is now clear that the rules just noted
concerning utilitarian features that apply to the states do not apply to
aesthetic features in federal courts in Section 43(a) cases or to states
under their anti-dilution statutes. Protection may be accorded to
product features that are neither distinctive nor have secondary
40. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 145; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 238; Sears, 376 U.S. at
231-32.
41. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232 ("mere inability of the public to tell two identical articles
apart is not enough to support an injunction against copying or an award of damages for
copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be copied").
42. See Kellogg Co, 305 U.S. at 121 (explaining that copier's obligation is not to en-
sure that there is no confusion whatsoever but to use every reasonable means to prevent
confusion).
43. Section 43(a) was amended by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Pub.
L. No. 100-667, tit. I, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988); Brown, supra n.31, at 1384.
44. Cf Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law
of Trade Dress Protection, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1116, 1163-64 (1998) ("Not all intellectual
creations are legally entitled to protection. In the current stage of intellectual property's
development, creations that deserve protection sometimes fall through the cracks at the
interstices between the domain of patent, copyright, and trademark. As tempting as it may
be to extend trademark law in order to rescue those creations from imitation by unde-
serving competitors, it is not the role of trademark law to serve as a catch-all mechanism
for the protection of intellectual creations which are not currently protected by another
body of intellectual-property law." ) (footnote omitted).
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meaning that inform consumers of the product's identity. 5 "The
explosion in product configuration cases in the last twenty years has a
lot more to do with acquiring or extending de facto patent and
copyright protection through a back door than with protecting
consumers from confusion.,
46
SearslCompco/Bonito Boats define the pre-emptive scope of
federal patent law vis-a-vis state law and clearly not vis-a-vis Section
43(a). 47 But the policies that the United States Supreme Court named
in Sears/CompcolBonito Boats to support its holdings are just as
appropriate in Section 43(a) cases involving aesthetic features.
[T]he same principle that motivated the Sears, Compco, and
Bonito Boats decisions - namely, the right of free imitation
of publicly known, unpatented articles - should guide the
interpretation of section 43(a). In short, section 43(a) should
not be applied in a way that circumvents the policies under-
lying federal patent law.48
Insofar as functionality is concerned, the consumer's interest in
competition requires that competitors be able to compete on equal
terms. The putative trademark that does not function as a source
identifier should not be treated as a trademark at all, and it should be
freely copiable.49 But the availability of alternatives to the subsequent
user of a putative trademark that does function as a source identifier
that are equally as low in cost as that incurred by the first user is
surely relevant, for it is the essence of C.. These considerations are
not consistently applied in cases involving issues of functionality.
There is hardly agreement on what is necessary for competition to be
45. See Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes, supra n.4, at 1159-60;
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, When Is Trade Dress "Inherently Distinctive" for Pur-
poses of Trade Dress Infringement Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 161 A.L.R. Fed. 327,
356-58 (2000) (Section 10, citing court opinions protecting product configuration trade
dress found to be inherently distinctive).
46. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1705 (1999).
47. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 145; Compco Corp., 376 U.S. 238; Sears, 376 U.S. at
231-32.
48. Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protec-
tion of Product Trade Dress Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 2037, 2061
(1993) (footnotes omitted).
49. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982)(The
court stated that "[o]ne who seeks to register (or protect) a product or container configu-
ration as a trademark must demonstrate that its design is 'nonfunctional,' . . . and that the
design functions as an indication of source ... These two requirements must ... be kept
separate from one another.").
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on equal terms when it comes to such matters as restaurant decor,"
color of dry cleaning press pads," children's seersucker outfits,52 or the
number of springs necessary for a device that prevents temporary
road signs from blowing over in high winds. 3 The existence of patent
law may broaden utilitarian functionality, but courts give aesthetic
functionality a considerably narrower reach: "[A]s applied in a large
number of cases, the requirement of nonfunctionality has not
significantly hindered the protection of attractive product features
that are an integral part of consumer demand for the product itself."54
The Lanham Act does not exist to encourage creative efforts,
contrary to the holdings of some courts when defining the scope of
and applying Section 43(a).5 Nevertheless, one commentator
concluded that "tests for functionality do not ask what may be
protected, but rather what may not."56
If trade dress serves as a source identifier, then it can do so only
if it has acquired secondary meaning. No putative source identifier
can serve as such unless consumers actually treat it as such or at least
expect it to act as such.57 The vast majority of putative source
identifiers do not function in this manner. 8 "'Unless the public has
come to know a particular mark as indicating a particular source of
origin, a finding of the requisite falsity would be anomalous since
there would be no standard against which to measure such falsity."'59
50. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Intl., Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
51. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159.
52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
53. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). In the four
United States Supreme Court cases to be discussed infra, the different courts that heard
each case were in agreement only in Two Pesos.
54. Gleiberman, supra n. 48, at 2061.
55. Id. at 2056-57 (noting purposes of Lanham Act and court's adoption of such a
purpose as a basis of § 43(a)).
56. Wong, supra n. 44, at 1154.
57. Cf Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade
Dress, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 769, 792 (1991)("The product characteristics protected by trade
dress are, like design, open and unconcealed. Information scarcity has a limited role here,
because it is not the unknown part of the product or service to which trade dress relates.
For products whose full characteristics are not apparent upon inspection, design protec-
tion identifies the source and thereby provides purchasers an assurance of quality for the
unknown part of the product. For products whose entire range of characteristics are ap-
parent upon inspection, however, trade dress protection of design does not provide any
assurance of quality.").
58. Lemley, supra n. 46, at 1704.
59. Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir.
1981)(quoting Kenneth B. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby Too Far, Maybe?, 49 Ind. L.J. 84, 103
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Failure to recognize this may lead to protection of unpatented
products from copying of utilitarian or functional features by
competitors, contrary to the teachings of SearslCompco/Bonito Boats
and contrary to the interest of consumers in "true" interbrand
competition.' A conclusion that a product's design is "inherently
distinctive" and therefore protectible6 implicitly relies upon a
determination that the presence of competition on equal terms is
equivalent to a product's trade dress having some positive
informational and identificatory value. This determination is most
certainly not accurate.
IV
Recent Cases
The United States Supreme Court has recently explored the
parameters of trade dress protection.62 This comment examines the
work of the Court in these cases and evaluates it against the basic
trademark principles previously set forth.
A. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.63 the United States
Supreme Court held that a restaurant's inherently distinctive trade
dress could be protected under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
(1973)).
60. Contra Gifford, supra n. 57, at 787 ("Competition in product design furthers the
social interest in maximizing consumer choice.... So long as there is no limit on poten-
tially attractive designs, no one producer will be able to exploit its own design for more
than the premium commanded by the relative value of that design vis-a-vis all other de-
signs in competition with it."); see also Diana Elzey Pinover, Aesthetic Functionality: The
Need for a Foreclosure of Competition, 83 Trademark Rep. 571, 577 (1993) (The aesthetic
functionality doctrine provides "disincentive[s] for development of imaginative and attrac-
tive design"; proposing that aesthetic functionality should be a defense only when failure
to do so would foreclose competition.); Robert Unikel, Better by Design: The Availability
of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design and the Demise of "Aesthetic Functionality,
85 Trademark Rep. 312, 332-42 (1995) (arguing for broad "penumbra of protection" of
product design).
61. See Buckman, supra n. 45, at 359-71 §§ 12(a), 13(a), 14, 16(a), 18, 21, 22 (noting
that clothing, furniture, food products (Pepperidge Farm Goldfish cheese crackers), toys,
golf clubs, golf hole, and theme restaurants have been protected because inherently dis-
tinctive).
62. See TrafFix, 530 U.S. 1260; Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. 205; Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159; Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
63. 505 U.S.763.
[24:73HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
without proof of secondary meaning.64 The plaintiff-respondent in the
case, Taco Cabana, Inc., operated a chain of fast-food Mexican
restaurants in Texas." It opened in 1978 and expanded to six
restaurants by 1985, all in the San Antonio area.66 Plaintiff described
its trade dress as:
"[A] festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and
patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings
and murals. The patio includes interior and exterior areas
with the interior patio capable of being sealed off from the
outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exte-
rior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using
top border paints and neon strips. Bright awnings and um-
brellas continue the theme.
67
Two Pesos, Inc. opened a restaurant in Houston with a similar motif,
68
and then expanded rapidly in Houston and into other markets, but
not into San Antonio.69 Taco Cabana entered the Houston and Austin
markets in 1986,70 and expanded into other Texas cities.71 Inevitably,
Two Pesos and Taco Cabana had competing restaurants in several
Texas cities.72
Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos.73 A jury answered questions
propounded by the trial judge thus: Taco Cabana had a non-
functional, inherently distinctive - because not descriptive 74 - trade
dress that lacked secondary meaning, and Two Pesos' concurrent use
of its motif created a likelihood of confusion on the part of ordinary
customers as to the source or association of its goods or services. It
was sufficient for Taco Cabana to recover if its mark either was
inherently distinctive or had acquired secondary meaning.76 The
64. Id. at 776.
65. Id. at 765.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 765 (quoting -Taco Cabana Intl., Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113,
1117 (5th Cir. 1991)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 765-66.
74. Id. at 766 n. 3.
75. Id. at 766.
76. Id.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
defendant-petitioner's argument that a finding of no secondary
meaning contradicted a finding of inherent distinctiveness."
The Court of Appeals perceived that its opinion conflicted with
the view of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit,"8 which held in Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique,
Inc.,7 a case involving a waist reducing belt,' that Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act protects unregistered trademarks or designs only when
there is secondary meaning." Instead, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit applied the rule82 of Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc.,83 a case involving the trade dress of bottles
that contained lawn and garden chemicals,' 'that an inherently
distinctive trade dress could be protected under Section 43(a), even
without proof of secondary meaning." The Supreme Court granted
certiorari "to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the
question whether trade dress that is inherently distinctive is
protectible under Section 43(a) without a showing that it has acquired
secondary meaning."'86
The Court began its analysis by noting that
it is common ground that [Section] 43(a) protects qualifying
unregistered trademarks and that the general principles
qualifying a mark for registration under [Section] 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining
whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under
[Section] 43(a).
The Court noted the spectrum of marks set forth by Judge Friendly'
in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,89 i.e., generic,
77. Id. at 767.
78. Id.
79. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
80. Id. at 300.
81. Id. at 301.
82. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767.
83. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
84. Id. at 696.
85. Id.
86. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767.
87. Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
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descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful.9 The last three
categories of marks are deemed to be inherently distinctive.91 Generic
marks are not registrable as trademarks.2 Descriptive marks are
registrable only upon acquiring secondary meaning.93 "The general
rule regarding distinctiveness is clear: an identifying mark is
distinctive and capable of being protected if it either is inherently
distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through secondary
meaning."'9
The Supreme Court agreed with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 5 "There is no persuasive reason to
apply to trade dress a general requirement of secondary meaning
which is at odds with the principles generally applicable to
infringement suits under [Section] 43(a)." 96 The Court approved the
Fifth Circuit's rejection of the argument that a finding of no
secondary meaning contradicts a finding of inherent distinctiveness.97
The necessary implication of this rejection is the legal recognition of a
trademark "'owner's legitimate proprietary interest in its unique and
valuable informational device, regardless of whether substantial
consumer association yet bestows the additional empirical protection
of secondary meaning.' 8
Petitioner-defendant conceded that it is possible for the trade
dress of a restaurant to be inherently distinctive," a costly concession.
Having made such a concession, petitioner-defendant was left to
make a relatively weak argument that the inherently distinctive trade
dress of a restaurant should be subject to defeasance over time if it
fails to acquire secondary meaning."°  Such an approach is
contradictory in that an inherently distinctive mark is protectible
from its first use without proof of secondary meaning." ' Moreover,
"[s]uch a trade dress, or mark, is not subject to copying by concerns
that have an equal opportunity to choose their own inherently
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 10-11.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 767.
96. Id. at 769.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 771 (quoting Taco Cabana Int'l., 932 F.2d at 1120, n. 7).
99. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 771.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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distinctive trade dress." ' 2 Failure to acquire secondary meaning
would be grounded upon lack of success in the marketplace, which is
not a valid basis upon which to deny protection."' "The user of such a
trade dress should be able to maintain what competitive position it
has and continue to seek wider identification among potential
customers."'°
The Court discussed the evolving position of the Second Circuit,
noting that it seemingly denied protection under Section 43(a) for
unregistered but distinctive marks whether "words or symbols or
distinctive product design."' 5 The Court indicated that such a holding
is in considerable tension with Section 2 of the Lanham Act,'O which
denies registration for marks without secondary meaning only if the
mark is descriptive. 7 The Court observed that the Second Circuit
may have limited its denial of protection to marks without secondary
meaning to trade dress."8 The Court rejected this view saying that if
trade dress is capable of inherent distinctiveness, secondary meaning
is not required to accord the mark protection under Section 43(a)."9
"There is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to" trade
dress cases and other types of trademarks under [Section] 43(a)."1 °
The Court observed that the Lanham Act affirmatively required
secondary meaning only for the registration of descriptive marks
under Section 2 and that there is no textual basis for requiring
secondary meaning under Section 43(a). 1' The Court also observed
that the functionality doctrine adequately protected competition1 2
and that requiring secondary meaning to protect trade dress under
Section 43(a) could have anticompetitive effects by making it more
difficult for startup firms to start a new product in a limited area and
then expand into new markets. 3
Justice Stevens concurred in the holding that once distinctiveness
of trade dress is established, secondary meaning is not necessary to
102. Id.
103. Id. at 777.
104. Id. at 771.
105. Id. at 772.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 773.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 773.
111. Id. at 774.
112. Id. at 774-75.
113. Id. at 775.
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show a violation of Section 43(a). '14 He noted that the original text of
Section 43(a) did not mention trade dress (or trademarks for that
matter), but court construction of it had extended its scope, consistent
with the purposes of the Lanham Act, to include trade dress."' He
observed in a footnote that "[ni]ostof the cases in which the Second
Circuit has said that secondary meaning is required did not involve
findings of inherent distinctiveness.' '
1 6
Justice Thomas concurred in the result,"7 but felt that it was not
necessary to make any reference to the requirements for registration
under Section 2 when determining the scope of Section 43(a).
1t 8
Rather the language of Section 43(a) itself was broad enough to
protect an arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive package"9 without regard
to whether other sections of the Lanham Act might require proof of
secondary meaning before according a trademark some sort of
protection. 20
Comment-
There are several elements of a Section 43(a) case, and the
Supreme Court's holding dealt only with the element of the existence
of a valid source identifier, i.e., a mark.1 2 The issue was whether
114. Id. at 784-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 781 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens included the following in
his footnote discussion:
For example, in Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652
F.2d 299 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982), the product at issue -
a velcro belt - was functional and lacked 'any distinctive, unique or
non-functional mark or feature.' 652 F.2d at 305. Similarly, in Stormy
Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (1987), the court de-
scribed functionality as a continuum, and placed the contested rain-
jacket closer to the functional end than to the distinctive end. Al-
though the court described the lightweight bag in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K
mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (1985), as having a distinctive appearance and
concluded that the District Court's finding of non-functionality was not
clearly erroneous, id. at 74, it did not explain why secondary meaning
was also required in such a case.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 781 n. 14.
117. Id. at 785 (Thomas, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 786 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 787 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 764.
20011 THE SUPREME COURT AND TRADE DRESS
secondary meaning is necessary to establish the validity of such an
identifier when the identifier is inherently distinctive.122 The Court did
not deal with the question of functionality."' In fact, the Court noted
that "it is also clear that eligibility for protection under [Section]
43(a) depends on nonfunctionality.', 2 4 Finally, the Court did not
equate proof of distinctiveness with proof of likelihood of confusion,
noting that "[i]t is, of course, also undisputed that liability under
[Section] 43(a) requires proof of the likelihood of confusion." '125
Trademark law has various counterpoises or opposites. The
federal district court treated descriptiveness as opposite to inherent
distinctiveness. '26 The Supreme Court accepted this legal conclusion,
even though it apparently masqueraded as a fact(s) to be decided by a
jury.127 Such a conclusion is quite appropriate in the context of
traditional word marks, e.g., Kodak, because inherently distinctive
word marks are inherently source identifying. 8 However, it is not at
all clear that descriptiveness and inherent distinctiveness are
opposites when applied to restaurant decor trade dress. Simply
importing the rules of Section 2 into Section 43(a) is not appropriate.
The opinion of Justice Thomas is the most accurate on this point.'29
Taking the facts as given by the Court,3° i.e., that the decor of the
restaurant was inherently distinctive even without secondary
meaning,' the ratio I/C, might be high, so that this trade dress should
be recognized as a protectible trademark. It could be high only
because C. was negligible, not because If was significant.
Traditionally, inherently distinctive marks are protected from their
first use because such marks have no purpose other than source
identification. An inherently distinctive trademark with little
consumer recognition still has some identificatory power, i.e., If is not
negligible. The decor of a restaurant that does not function as a
source identifier certainly has purposes other than source
122. Id.
123. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (dis-
tinctiveness and nonfunctionality are legal requirements that must "be kept separate from
one another").
124. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 770.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 773.
129. Id. at 785-87 (Thomas, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 765.
131. Id. at 776.
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identification. If so, the SearslCompcolBonito Boats doctrine would
imply that state law cannot prohibit copying. Federal law should be
no different.
There is something unsettling about ruling that the trade dress of
a Mexican restaurant, located anywhere, but in this case in south
Texas, could be inherently distinctive32 in the sense of its having
identificatory and informational power. But once the point is
conceded, the rest seems to follow, even without reliance on Section
2, as Justice Thomas argued.133 The principle expressio unius est
alterius exclusio applied to Section 2 of the Lanham Act, i.e.,
secondary meaning is named as a requirement only for descriptive
marks and is therefore not a requirement for other types of marks,
even as support and not as a controlling rule of statutory construction,
quickly proves to be unsound. Instead, whether secondary meaning is
required should, and ultimately does, turn on consumer expectations.
The Court spoke of Taco Cabana's trade dress as its "unique and
informational device," even though it lacked secondary meaning.134
The Court also indicated that the functionality doctrine adequately
protects competition."3 As long as the Court treated Taco Cabana's
trade dress as a source identifier, its comments about functionality
would be consistent with SearslCompco/Bonito Boats. However, if the
Court was implying that copying is not permitted unless a feature is
functional, then the Court's holding goes beyond the spirit of
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats.
B. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.
In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.," 6 the United States
Supreme Court held that color alone could sometimes be a
protectible trademark. 37 For many years, Qualitex sold press pads to
dry cleaners that were green-gold."3 In 1989, a competitor, Jacobson,
began selling press pads that were also green-gold.'39 Qualitex sued
Jacobson." Qualitex subsequently registered the color as a trademark
132. See Gleiberman, supra n. 48, at 2043.
133. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 785-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 771.
135. Id. at 775.
136. 514 U.S. 159.
137. Id. at 174.
138. Id. at 161.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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in 1991."' Qualitex prevailed in the district court.'42 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the judgment by
applying a rule that color alone could not be registered as a
trademark.'43 This view differed from the view taken in other
circuits,' and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
145
The Court first observed that there was nothing in the language
of the Lanham Act that would preclude treating color alone as a
trademark. 46 Moreover, the court noted that color alone is capable of
identifying a user's goods and distinguishing them from others. 147 The
Court also observed that "a product's color is unlike 'fanciful,'
'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive' words or designs, which almost
automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand.', 148 But with
continued use, color alone may develop secondary meaning causing
customers to come to treat it as signifying a brand.'49
The Court noted the basic objectives of trademark law as
reducing a "customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions."'' 0 Trademark law accomplishes these objectives by
preventing competitors from copying a source-identifying mark so
that potential customers may quickly and easily know that a
particular item was made by the same producer as products with the
same mark.5'
At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it
(and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial,
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable prod-
uct. The law thereby "encourage[s] the production of quality
products," and simultaneously discourages those who hope
to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's in-
ability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for
sale. It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark - not its
ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994).
144. Id.
145. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 159.
146. Id. at 162.
147. Id.
148. Id. 162-63 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
149. Id. at 163.
150. Id. at 163-64, (quoting 1 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 2.01[2] (3d ed. 1994)).
151. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64.
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that permits it to serve these basic purposes.
With this analysis, the Court has apparently broadened the categories
of things that may be protected as trademarks so that there are fewer
limits, save that they actually function as trademarks.
The doctrine of functionality also does not support a per se
rule concerning color.
"[A] product feature is functional," and cannot serve as a
trademark, "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the ar-
ticle or if it affects the cost or quality of the article," that is,
if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage. Although
sometimes color plays an important role (unrelated to
source identification) in making a product more desirable,
sometimes it does not. And, this latter fact - the fact that
sometimes color is not essential to a product's use or pur-
pose and does not affect cost or quality - indicates that the
doctrine of "functionality" does not create an absolute bar
to the use of color alone as a mark.' '5 3
Qualitex's green-gold press pads were not functional because there
was no competitive need for the green-gold color.'54 Since the green-
gold color identified Qualitex press pads to customers, there was no
apparent reason the color should not be protected as a trademark."'
The Court rejected respondent Jacobson's other contentions that
color alone should not be recognized as a trademark.156 Lower courts
can apply established principles to cases involving color to resolve
difficult questions of shade confusion, just as they apply established
principles to resolve other difficult questions.'57 The occasional
problem of color depletion that might arise for particular products
does not justify a blanket prohibition of treating color as a trademark;
rather, the doctrine of functionality can prevent anticompetitive
consequences in appropriate circumstances.' The Court rejected
152. Id. at 164 (quoting McCarthy, supra. n. 150, at § 2.01[2] (other citations omit-
ted)).
153. Id. at 165 (quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 850 n.10 (1982) (other citation omitted)).
154. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. This test of functionality is broader than what the
Court apparently accepted later in TrafFix. Cf. 532 U.S. 23.
155. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
156. Id. at 174-76.
157. Id. at 167-68.
158. Id. at 168-69.
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reliance on dicta from cases pre-dating the Lanham Act that might
have suggested that color alone cannot be the subject of a
trademark. 9 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that a rule
protecting color as trade dress when it is part of a trademark is
sufficient and instead held that color alone may be a trademark.''
Comment-
In holding as it did, the Court opened for consideration the
notion that some facets of a product may not automatically qualify for
trademark protection, but might so qualify upon acquiring secondary
meaning. 6' The Court also opened the possibility that practically any
facet of a product may function as a trademark and be protectible as
such. The Court also made functionality a counterpoise to the better
of the arguments traditionally raised against recognizing color alone
as a trademark, i.e., shade confusion, color depletion.' The Court
reiterated a definition of functionality that it had stated earlier, i.e., a
product feature that "'is essential to the use or purpose of the article
or ... affects the cost or quality of the article,""'63 and added as an
equivalent statement, "that is, if exclusive use of the feature would
put competitors at a significant non-reputation-relateddisadvantage. '' 64
The phrase "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"
contains both a quantitative ("significant") and a qualitative ("non-
reputation-related disadvantage") aspect. The quantitative aspect
seems to imply that a "little" non-reputation-related disadvantage
may function as a trademark. This runs counter to the spirit of
Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats, so that a competitor might be denied the
right to copy a non-identificatory feature so long as that feature
endowed the product with no "significant" advantage. The lower
courts have equated this with a significant competitive
disadvantage.'65 The Court would shortly have occasion to visit this
question again in the context of trade dress after Congress had made
its legislative contribution.
In Qualitex, If was significant and could be significant only
159. Id. at 170-73.
160. Id. at 173-74.
161. Id. at 162-64.
162. Id. at 168-70.
163. Id. at 169.
164. Id.
165. See e.g. Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d at 940.
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because the green-gold color had secondary meaning. Otherwise
consumers draw no particular conclusion upon seeing a product in a
particular color. And only so long as C, is not great as considered on a
case-by-case basis will color alone be protected as a trademark. It is
worth noting that Qualitex involved a registered mark' 66 and so was
readily treated as an infringement case rather than an unfair
competition case.
In the Trademark Amendments Act of 1999,67 Congress added
subsection (3) to Section 43(a). That provision places the burden of
proving non-functionality on the one asserting protection for
unregistered trade dress."
C. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc 69 the United
States Supreme Court held that a product's trade dress, when
comprised of the product itself, could be protected in an action under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act only if the trade dress had acquired
secondary meaning.7 In Wal-Mart, plaintiff-respondent Samara
Brothers designed and manufactured children's clothing and
developed "a line of spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits
decorated with appliqu6s of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like....
Chain stores sold this line of clothing.' Wal-Mart and others
developed knockoffs that it commissioned a supplier to produce.'
Samara sued in the United States Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York.'74 A jury found in favor of Samara on
all claims, including one for trade dress infringement under Section
43(a). 175 The district court awarded Samara $1.6 million.'76 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of
a judgment as a matter of law. 7'
The Supreme Court noted that lower courts had extended
166. 514 U.S. at 161.
167. Pub. L. No. 106-43 § 5, 113 Stat. 218,220 (1999).
168. See id.
169. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
170. Id. at 216.
171. Id. at 207.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 208.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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protection to trade dress - first to containers and then to products
themselves - under Section 43(a) and that the plaintiff in such
actions must show that its mark is distinctive, either inherently or
through secondary meaning.'78 The Court noted of Section 2 of the
Lanham Act:
Nothing in [Section] 2... demands the conclusion that every
category of mark necessarily includes some marks "by which
the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others" without secondary meaning - that in every
category some marks are inherently distinctive."'
In light of what follows, this gloss on Section 2 is interesting. In Two
Pesos the statutory requirement of secondary meaning for
registration of descriptive marks supported the conclusion that other
classifications of marks did not require secondary meaning.'80 In Wal-
Mart, such language apparently does not compel the conclusion that
some classes of marks are entitled to protection, regardless of the
mark's classification. 8' Indeed, color can never be inherently
distinctive, and secondary meaning is needed for its protection
182
because a color "does not 'almost automatically tell a customer that
[it] refer[s] to a brand,' and does not 'immediately... signal a brand
or a product source.''
' 83
The Court held that a product's design is to be treated the same
as colors."4
D]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive. The attri-
ution of inherent distinctiveness to certain categories of
word marks and product packaging derives from the fact
that the very purpose of attaching a particular word to a
product, or encasing it in a distinctive packaging ,is most of-
ten to identify the source of the product .... [W]here it is
not reasonable to assume consumer predisposition to take
an affixed word or packaging as indication of source ... in-
herent distinctiveness will not be found.... In the case of
product design, as in the case of color, we think consumer
178. Id. at 209-11.
179. Id. at 211 (emphasis in original).
180. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763.
181. 529 U.S. at 205.
182. Id. at 212.
183. Id. (emphasis in original).
184. Id. at 213.
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predisposition to equate the feature with the source does
not exist. Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost
invariably, even the most unusual of product designs... is
intended not to identify the source, but to render the prod-
uct itself more useful or more appealing."'
A rule protecting trade dress should not injure consumers who seek
utility and esthetics in their products by facilitating competitors' suits
against each other."6 Rather the developer of a trade dress can seek
protection through a design patent or a copyright."7
The Court distinguished Two Pesos by saying that that case did
not involve product design trade dress, but rather product packaging
trade dress or something akin to product packaging (tertium quid),
which can be inherently distinctive.188 The Court indicated that close
cases involving the distinction between product design and product
packaging should be resolved in favor of concluding that they involve
product design and therefore require secondary meaning for
protection under Section 43(a).9
Comment.
The Court's holding confines Two Pesos to cases of product
packaging, i.e., to cases where the thing to be protected is something
that a consumer would expect to denote source."9 This helps to move
the law of trade dress in the direction of protecting the interest of
consumers who benefit from competition. 9' The presumption in cases
of trade dress product design is that competitors should have free
access to those designs.1" Remarkably, this position is not that
different from the positions taken in the cases decided by the Second
Circuit with which the Supreme Court took issue in Two Pesos.93 In
Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc.," the court held that
plaintiff could prevail in an action for trade dress infringement of a
185. Id. at 212-13 (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 213.
187. Id. at 214.
188. Id. at 215.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 505 U.S. at 763.
194. 652 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
2001] THE SUPREME COURT AND TRADE DRESS
"Waist Away" belt only if it proved secondary meaning.9 In Stormy
Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., '96 the court held that plaintiff could
prevail in an action for trade dress infringement of a raincoat with
vents that facilitated the release of perspiration only if it proved
secondary meaning.'97 And in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,9 the
court held the plaintiff could prevail in an action for trade dress
infringement of lightweight luggage and bags because it showed
secondary meaning and because the defendant failed to establish
functionality.199 Thus, all of these cases involved product configuration
trade dress. In contrast, Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc. ,2° the case that the Fifth Circuit relied upon
to establish the rule of inherent distinctiveness for trade dress later
approved by the Supreme Court in Two Pesos,°' involved the trade
dress of bottles, clearly packaging trade dress.2"
The value of the quotient I/C, is not great in the case of product
design trade dress that has no secondary meaning because the value
of If is zero when the identifier is neither expected to function as such
nor does function as such. Even if the value of C in matters of
product design is negligible, the value of I/C, is still zero (0) -
meaning that is has no identificatory power. Moreover, copying
features that make a product "more useful or more appealing" does
not affect C., but certainly does affect the level of interbrand
competition. Hopefully, the Court has made this, rather than
attractiveness of an unpatented, uncopyrighted product, the
touchstone of legal protection of a product's trade dress."'
Interestingly the court in Keene Corp. applied its rule of aesthetic
195. Id. at 301.
196. 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987).
197. Id. at 974.
198. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
199. Id. at 75.
200. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126.
201. 505 U.S. at 767.
202. Chevron Chemical, 659 F.2d at 696.
203. But cf Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) ("
The difficulty with accepting a broad view of aesthetic functionality, which relates the doc-
trine to the commercial desirability of the feature at issue without consideration of its utili-
tarian function, is that it provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and at-
tractive design. The more appealing the design, the less protection it would receive. As our
ambience becomes more mechanized and banal, it would be unfortunate were we to dis-
courage use of a spark of originality which could transform an ordinary product into one
of grace.").
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functionality to find a feature functional and copiable by defendant.2l
By saying that the developer of a trade dress can seek protection
through a design patent or a copyright, the Court has taken a step to
make Sears/CompcolBonito Boats applicable to Section 43(a) trade
dress cases.
D. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.
In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. ,25 plaintiff-
respondent MDI owned two utility patents for a mechanism that
incorporated two springs to keep outdoor signs from blowing over in
adverse wind conditions."' MDI established a successful business and
claimed that buyers and users recognized its stands because of their
visible dual-spring design 7.20 After the patents expired, defendant
TrafFix had MDI's product reverse engineered and produced a
competing copy.0 8 MDI sued and alleged, among other things, that
TrafFix had infringed its trade dress.'l The United States Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan determined that
the dual-spring design was the only element of MDI's trade dress at
issue .2 " The District Court held as a matter of law, by way of
summary judgment, that MDI had failed to establish secondary
meaning and that in any event the design was functional.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed both determinations of the District Court. 12 The Court of
Appeals observed that "it took 'little imagination to conceive of a
hidden dual-spring mechanism or a tri- or quad-spring mechanism
that might avoid infringing [MDI's] trade dress.', 213 A competitor who
chose a dual-spring design would have to find some other way to set
its product apart so as to avoid infringing MDI's trade dress. 4 With
regard to functionality, the Court of Appeals implied a standard by
holding "that allowing exclusive use of a particular feature such as the
dual-spring design in the guise of trade dress would 'hinde[r]
204. Id.
205. 532 U.S. 23.
206. Id. at 1258.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1258-59.
213. Id. at 1259.
214. Id.
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competition somewhat.' Rather '[e]xclusive use of a feature must "put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"
before trade dress protection is denied on functionality grounds.' 2.5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict in the circuits on the issue of "whether the existence of an
expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the patentee's
claiming trade dress protection in a product's design." '216 The Court
noted that courts of appeals have held that the Lanham Act provides
a claim for infringing a distinctive trade dress, and that Congress
implicitly endorsed these determinations by amending the Lanham
Act to provide that the person asserting a right to protection of an
unregistered trade dress must prove that the matter to be protected is
not functional. 7
The Court observed that this allocation of the burden of proof
plus its own admonition in Wal-Mart not to over-extend protection of
trade dress "give force to the well-established rule that trade dress
protection may not be claimed for product features that are
functional."2 '8 Implicitly, then: "trade dress protection must subsist
with the recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition
against copying goods and products. In general, unless an intellectual
property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be
subject to copying."219 Such copying is part of our competitive
economy.
The Court then restated and modified the question before it and
stated its conclusion:
The principal question in this case is the effect of an expired
patent on a claim of trade dress infringement. A prior pat-
ent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the trade
dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the fea-
tures therein claimed are functional. If trade dress protec-
tion is sought for those features the strong evidence of func-
tionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to
the statutory presumption that features are deemed func-
tional until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade
dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed the fea-
215. Id. (quoting Qualitex v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (emphasis
in original)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id at 1260.
220. Id.
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tures in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress pro-
tection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the fea-
ture is not functional, for instance by showing that it is
merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device.22
The Court's grant of certiorari was to resolve a conflict, and this
excerpt shows that the Court did not unconditionally take either side
in that conflict. Rather the Court adopted the view that trade dress
protection is not foreclosed when there is a utility patent,222 but the
burden on the one claiming infringement is so high223 that such
foreclosure may be the practical effect of the Court's language. A
claimant must overcome the statutory presumption of functionality of
Section 43(a)(3), a presumption made stronger by the presence of an
expired utility patent, perhaps by affirmatively showing that the
design is an "ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device."224
The Court held that MDI's trade dress claim was barred under
the rule just established: "MDI did not, and cannot, carry the burden
of overcoming the strong evidentiary inference of functionality based
on the disclosure of the dual-spring design in the claims of the expired
patents." '225 In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined evidence
concerning the patent itself and its history.226 Plaintiff-respondent had
prevailed in an infringement case against one whose design was
sufficiently like that of TrafFix to establish that TrafFix's product
would have infringed plaintiff-respondent's patent,227 nearly a form of
collateral estoppel without mutuality. Statements in the patent
application as well as in the course of patent prosecution
"demonstrate[d] the functionality of the design.""22 Thus, in order to
procure a patent and to protect it against infringement, the patent
holder must act at cross purposes to a later claim of trade dress
protection under Section 43(a).229
The Court considered the proper definition of functionality and
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1261.
229. Id. at 1261-62.
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rejected the Sixth Circuit's requirement of competitive necessity.23°
Instead, the Court held that
a feature.., is functional when it is essential to the'use or
purpose of the device or when it affects the cost of quality of
the device.... Where the design is functional under [this]
formulation there is no need to proceed further to consider
if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.23
Thus, "competitive necessity," a functionality standard that allows
less copying than "essential to the use or purpose of the device or...
[affecting] the cost of quality of the device," is not a necessary
element of functionality.2
Once functionality is established, secondary meaning is not an
issue233 nor do competitors have to explore the existence of alternative
designs.234
If buyers are assured the product serves its purpose by see-
ing the operative mechanism that in itself serves an impor-
tant need. It would be at cross-purposes to those objectives,
and something of a paradox, were we to require the manu-
facturer to conceal the very item the user seeks.235
A product feature may identify functionality to a consumer as well as
the product's origin - and when it does identify functionality,
competitors may freely copy it.236
"[A]rbitrary, incidental, or ornamental aspects of features of a
product found in the patent claims" may be protected if the
"manufacturer could.., prove that those aspects do not serve a
purpose within the terms of the utility patent., 237 If a design feature
claimed is a "useful part of the invention," then competitors may copy
it.238
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1262-63.
232. Id. at 1261.
233. See id. at 1262 (applying rule); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §17,
comment a (1995) (Functional design is ineligible for protection regardless of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness.).
234. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33-34.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (emphasis added)
238. Id.
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The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for
their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the
purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. The
Lanham Act, furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a
functional design simply because an investment has been
made to encourage the public to associate a particular func-
tional feature with a single manufacturer or seller."239
This language should give new vigor to competitors' right to copy,
irrespective of whether a product feature is functional.
TrafFix argued that the Patent Clause of the Constitution "of its
own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from
claiming trade dress protection.""24 The Court stated that it need not
resolve this question,241 even though it appears to be the point of
conflict among the courts of appeal that the Court granted certiorari
to resolve.242
Comment-
In TrafFix, the Court relied on Section 43(a)(3) plus the policy of
the patent laws to move functionality in the direction of greater rights
of competitors than that given by lower courts under their
construction of the "significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"
standard of functionality.43 The Court applied that standard, but
reduced the quantitative measure of the standard (i.e., "significant")
so that the non-reputation-related advantage that enables
competitors to copy a product feature on the basis of functionality
need be less than many lower courts had previously thought.2" Mere
usefulness may be sufficient when there is a utility patent thrown into
the mix.245
The counterpoise considered by the Court was in fact between
distinctiveness and functionality.246  The Court elevated the
evidentiary effect of a utility patent in establishing functionality,
indeed the Court nearly seemed to equate the two when it offered
239. Id. at 1262-63.
240. Id. at 1263.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1261-62.
244. Id. at 1262-63.
245. Id. at 1262.
246. Id.
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that disproving functionality may be accomplished by showing that a
product feature is "merely ... ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary." '247
Moreover, the Court noted that competitive necessity is not an
element of functionality.2" This goes far to restore to competitors a
right to copy.
Even if we assume that If is not insignificant, the value of C is
significant when a putative identificatory and informational feature is
the basis of a utility patent. The Court makes the low cost of
alternatives a factor in the functionality determination when it
suggests that plaintiff could disprove functionality by demonstrating
that the feature is "merely... ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary" '249
- i.e., that there is nearly an unlimited availability of alternatives.
V
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court should interpret Section 43(a)
consistently with the constitutional rules it has laid down for state tort
law. In Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats, the Court established a broad
right to copy product features not sufficiently reflecting invention or
creativity to be worthy of a patent or copyright.25 In Ives/Qualitex the
Court set down rules governing functionality that permit copying of
source-identifying feature(s) when there is competitive need to
copy."' Taken together, and observing that the principles are not co-
terminal, these rules further interbrand competition to the greatest
extent possible in the area of trade dress.
A problem in Section 43(a) jurisprudence is the tendency of
courts to view various elements of a claim as opposites, i.e.,
counterpoises, of each other. There are well-established opposites in
trademark law. For example, descriptive or generic word marks are
opposite from inherently distinctive word marks. But the elements of
a trademark infringement case whose outcome will benefit consumers
include (1) an actual valid source identifier, (2) concurrent use, (3)
likelihood of confusion, and (4) non-functionality. Proof of any one of
these elements does not prove any of the other elements - or
247. Id. at 1260.
248. See id. at 1261.
249. Id. at 1260.
250. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 143; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237; Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
251. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164.
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disprove any of them. Inherent distinctiveness does not preclude the
possibility that a mark might be functional.252 Inherent distinctiveness
does not preclude the possibility that consumers are not likely to be
confused by a competitor's use.253 Nor does non-functionality preclude
the possibility that a feature has no identificatory and informational
power and as such is not a valid trademark. Distinctiveness does not
preclude the possibility that a product feature is functional.254
Each element of a claim is a necessary element in promoting
interbrand competition that maximizes consumer value. Protection of
a product feature with no identificatory power provides consumers
nothing, but it does deprive them of the benefits of competition.
2 15
Treating a product feature as a non-functional source identifier when
its aesthetic appeal is necessary to compete or when it in fact
identifies nothing of relevance to consumers, denies consumers the
benefits of competition. "If a feature renders a product desirable for
any reason other than association with a source or sponsor, then it is
'functional' (i.e., serves a function other than identification of
source)."256
The Court has clearly moved in the direction of promoting
interbrand competition at the expense of competitors who want the
same protection that the Stiffel Lamp Company wanted under the
state tort law of Illinois.257 Those who lament that our existence
becomes more mechanized and banal when the spark of originality
can be copied258 should realize that most trade dress is not
significantly original. Patent and copyright laws should define what is
not banal. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in writing about such banality, could as easily have been
talking about pole lamps.259 Whether utilitarian or aesthetic,
competition benefits consumers more than protection of non-
252. See discussion of Two Pesos, supra Part IV; In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at
1343.
253. See discussion of Two Pesos, supra Part IV.
254. See id.
255. See generally Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85
Trademark Rep. 19 (1995) (arguing that courts' views on trademark licensing, trade dress,
secondary meaning in the making, and dilution are gradually transforming trademark
rights into rights in gross to the detriment of competition beneficial to consumers).
256. Wong, supra n. 44, at 1133.
257. Sears, 376 U.S. 225 (Sears copied Stiffel's pole lamp; competitor's protection
against product copying provided by Illinois tort law unconstitutional.).
258. See Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 825.
259. See id.
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identificatory product features.26
Interbrand competition is promoted when I/C has value. The
Court correctly broadens legally protected sources of information to
anything, irrespective of their ontological status,261 but the Court has
reasserted in so many words that the I, associated with such a
"source" cannot be 0 or negligible.262 Consumers must recognize a
product identifier as such in order for a product feature to have
identificatory power. Consumer expectations are certainly relevant.
Consumers do indeed expect that packaging is an identifier; they do
not expect the product itself to be a source identifier.263 The non-
patented, non-copyrighted, unrecognized trade dress cannot put
competitors at a disadvantage, i.e., raise C,,26 at all.
Section 43(a) should be construed in such a way that consumers,
not the competitors who use trademarks, are paramount. While
congressional power under the Patent/Copyright Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution may be broad when combined,
according consumers a paramount place in the competitive market
economy requires a clear demarcation between the two. Section 43(a)
should not be a surrogate for patent or copyright protection.
260. See Wong, supra n. 44, at 1167 ("Courts should conclude, as they did on the issue
of utilitarian features, that aggressive price competition better serves the public than the
encouragement of innovation for aesthetic features.").
261. See discussion of Two Pesos and Qualitex, supra Part IV.
262. See discussion of Qualitex and Wal-Mart, supra Part IV.
263. See discussion of Two Pesos and Wal-Mart, supra Part IV.
264. See discussion of TrafFix, supra Part IV.
265. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94 (The Court struck down early trade-
mark legislation insofar as it constituted an exercise of congressional power "to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inven-
tors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." A trademark is not an
"invention or discovery" (patent) nor a "writing" (copyright).).
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